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When did duration begin? By which I mean, when did the notion of time passing there and 
then in the life of the performer/spectator become significant in performance? Not the local 
detail of how long the piece might be, but the focus on duration itself as a constituent of our 
experience? 
 
To approach an answer, let’s start not exactly at the beginning but at an obvious reference 
point. Discussions of duration in art usually light upon Henri Bergson’s writing on duration 
and experience in Time and Free Will (1889), Creative Evolution (1907) and The Creative 
Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics (1912) – and this essay is no exception, not least since 
Bergson’s writing takes on additional resonance in a digital era. We are interested in 
duration not so much in terms of length than as a virtual massif of experience. 
 
Christina Chau gives a useful potted summary: 
For Bergson, duration is the time that we experience subjectively. It not only entails 
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affecting the experience of the present. Therefore, the present preserves images of 
the past while gathering the potential future, both of which coexist virtually with the 
present. In this sense, duration is both a continuous unity while also heterogeneous in 
nature. (Chau 2017: 102) 
 
Chau articulates a prevailing account of Bergson’s thinking: duration is less a measure of 
time, and more a function of the feeling of time passing. As we can doubtless all attest, a 
performance can be fifteen minutes long and feel as though it drags (those markers of 
unstopped duration, ‘endlessly’ and ‘interminably’, might crop up in conversation 
afterwards); or else six hours long (or longer) and so continually absorbing that you don’t 
know where the time went (as, from my own perspective, Ex Machina’s The Dragon’s 
Trilogy, Elevator Repair Service’s Gatz or ZU-UK’s Hotel Medea). 
 
Reading Bergson now, what’s striking is how a philosophy that combines late-nineteenth-
century concerns with positivism, interiority and vitalism also reverberates with tendencies 
in digital culture. Bergson argues that ‘we project time into space, we express duration in 
terms of extensity’; what’s implied in this conjunction of the temporal and spatial is ‘the 
perception, no longer successive, but simultaneous, of a before and after’ (Bergson 2013: 
101). This prefigures a digital notion of time, the sort of availability that we now assume 
(through digital distribution, ever-extending chats and timelines, and growing digital 
archives) of an accumulating past held within a continually reforming present. This is a 
present that understands a post-present always already unfolding – one that can moreover 
be deferred, visited later, enjoyed plurally. Simultaneity in Bergsonian thinking is a key 
perceptual trope. Synthesis (a central term) prevails over separation in the perception and 
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experience of duration (2013: 9, 10). Succession (Bergson is talking here of conscious states, 
analogous to the musical phrase), can be thought of as ‘a mutual penetration, an 
interconnexion and organisation of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and 
cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought’ (101). How disposed 
this is to ideas of process, becoming, flow, seriality and synchronicity that characterise our 
engagements in digital culture. 
 
Yet Bergson was also of his time. His work circulates around the ‘unit’ of mathematical 
calculation, the determinate swing of the mechanical pendulum, the striking of the hour on 
a neighbour’s clock – those instances of calibrated measurement that are then effaced in 
the more subjective domain of duration. Katherine Biers reminds us that 
Late nineteenth-century popular plays were alive with the sights and sounds of 
working clocks, their pointing hands, swinging pendulums, and striking bells 
announcing the time of significant events and actions in the fictional stage world. … 
Circa 1900, precise, active, and individual timekeeping had become a necessity for 
information work within a rapidly globalizing economy. (Biers 2018: 318) 
 
The latter was characterised by transport schedules, commercial opening and closing times, 
and the standardisation of international time zones. Whilst the minutiae of time became 
more critical, so the representation of time became newly important, and the experience of 
time concomitantly negotiated. Bergson’s thinking, then, takes place amid this 
chronocentric churn. Meanwhile in 1889, when his doctoral thesis Time and Free Will: An 
Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness was published, Strindberg’s The Stronger was 
first performed and Creditors published, Tolstoy presented The Fruits of Enlightenment (a 
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play directed a couple of years later by Stanislavsky), Chekhov wrote The Wood Demon and 
a couple of one-act dramas, and Maeterlinck’s first play, Princess Maleine, was published. 
The theatre was turning to a new realism that was already sketched with shades of 
symbolism and expressionism, in its efforts to depict actual circumstances and experiences 
whilst figuring these through aesthetically diverse modes. This isn’t to suggest (in answer to 
my opening question) that duration began in 1889, but time took on a conceptually 
different shape during this period, and in parallel experience was figured differently in and 
through artworks. 
 
‘Durational art’ and ‘durational performance’ tend to describe longer-form pieces than the 
nineteenth-century play (even though the latter might sometimes be experienced as an 
endurance) and a tranche of body-art and time-based work from around the 1960s 
onwards. As André Lepecki suggests, ‘Adjectively, “durational” is used to describe artworks 
that last longer than the average/expected amount of time that chrono-normativity imposes 
on art.’ (Lepecki) – whether for hours, days or years. Celebrated instances include Robert 
Wilson’s KA MOUNTAIN AND GUARDenia TERRACE (1972), which lasted for seven days; 
Tehching Hsieh’s series of year-long performance pieces between 1978-86 (the last of 
which, No Art Piece, involved a complete renunciation of artistic practice); and stretchingly, 
John Cage’s As Slow as Possible (1987), an organ piece with a duration of 639 years. 
 
All of which said, durational performance can also be significantly short, a lesser than usual 
chrono-expression. Think of Samuel Beckett’s Breath (1969), for instance, in which there is 
an inspiration (we understand inhalation) and an expiration, bookended by a cry (‘an instant 
of recorded vagitus’), with punctuations of silence. Together the sequence lasts for around 
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35 seconds. Or consider an apogee of durational art – and a literal reference point – Cage’s 
4’33” (1952), the title of which provides the precise timeframe for a musical performance by 
any number of players and instruments, none of whom play during the piece, leaving the 
auditor/spectator to contemplate the sound of the not-entirely-silence that ensues. 
 
In these works, duration matters not so much because it requires endurance that entails a 
form of suffering (an aspect of time-based art that Lepicki and the performance artist 
Marina Abramović emphasise), but because it provides an intense focus on a 
being/becoming that takes place over time. Both pieces emphasise the attentive 
engagement of the audience member, and here we can reconnect an aesthetic of intensity 
of affect with the longer-form pieces of performance art, and indeed an understanding of 
duration that spans the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. 
In her discussion of late-Victorian melodrama, Biers describes ‘a heterogeneity of subjective 
times that escape public inscription’ (2018: 319) – a Bergsonian way of putting it, perhaps. 
The notion of heterogeneity applies in the abstract spaces of Breath and 4’33”, whilst it 
attains fresh impetus in digital culture alongside the idea of heterochonology. Cued by 
Bergson’s description of single units giving way to experiential flow, we can consider how 
component parts of artistic assemblages might contribute to particular affective formations 
even whilst we acknowledge their multiplicity. It’s this collation of diversely effective 
elements – in temporal terms, the ‘hetero’ in heterochronology – that gives duration a 
particular flavour for contemporary cultural consumers. 
 
We can turn to those media of fixed impression, photography and painting, to help provide 
a perspective on this – and in turn, a position on duration in performance. In his essay 
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‘Heterochronies’, Giovanni Careri discusses three Renaissance paintings by Caravaggio that 
hang in the Contarelli Chapel in Rome: 
Facing me above the altar, St. Matthew writes instructed by an angel [St Matthew and 
the Angel, 1602], to the left Christ calls the saint to follow him [The Calling of St 
Matthew, 1599-1600], to the right he suffers martyrdom [The Martyrdom of St 
Matthew, 1599-1600]. Many temporalities interact in this situation: the moment of 
the Now-Time belonging to the spectator, the time of the Then in which these scenes 
are supposed to have taken place, the time of the creation of these works at the end 
of the sixteenth century.’ (Careri 2018: 149, original emphases) 
 
Unfolding these temporalities in relation to The Calling of St Matthew, Careri notes the 
distinctly periodised clothing worn by the tax collector and those around him (sixteenth-
century – that’s to say, contemporaneous with the artist) and the different garb of Jesus and 
Peter (‘antique’, so associated with the setting of the gospels). History is both insisted upon 
– people are of their moment – but effaced in the context of sublime visitation, as if Christ 
can transport through the centuries to arrive whenever and wherever he pleases.  
 
Multiplications of time also occur in The Martyrdom of St Matthew. Careri pithily observes 
that whilst he is being assailed by his assassin, Matthew’s ‘body is already half in the tomb 
while he is still alive and already admitted into heaven’ (161, original emphases) – a 
suggestive instance of Caravaggio’s ‘heterochronic interaction of times’ (153). Careri doesn’t 
muse upon the relations between the three paintings as a sequence, but their arrangement 
evidently contributes to the sense of time as both pluralised and synthesised. The trio might 
easily be read as a triptych showing past, present and future; or else as a series of narratival 
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now-moments; or as a symbolic continuum of determination and destiny, sacrifice and 
suffering – not unlike the multiple readings offered by Bill Viola’s Nantes Triptych (1992), a 
video installation that shows a birth, a death (that of Viola’s mother) and, between them, a 
body suspended vertically in water. In both cases, the images demand to be read 
synchronously and holistically (we might say in a Bergsonian manner) rather than as an 
assemblage of discrete parts. Duration, here, is proliferated, and the effect of such 
multiplication of moments is to emphasise aspects of actuality by putting us in the face of 
the lived experience of action and consequence. Indeed, Careri suggests that ‘[m]aking the 
“real” enter the space of representation is one of the principles of Caravaggio’s poetics’ 
(162). 
 
This reminds us of Roland Barthes’ account of the operations of photography in Camera 
Lucida, not only by way of the punctum (the arresting detail) but also the noeme – an 
essential realisation of a present that was once witnessed and endures as of record, a 
permanent demonstration of iteration (see Shurkus 2014: 69, 73). The photograph 
(normally) suggests that there is a noeme. The painting might figure a ‘real’ through 
different representational means. In performance, a focus on the passing of presently-lived 
time has a similar effect. It interposes the ‘real’ of temporal process in the 
topic/fiction/theme/moment of the performance itself. Barthes’ celebrated statement that 
‘Every photograph is a certificate of presence’ (1993: 87 [ch 36-check]) might be 
reformulated: every performance is an endorsement of presence – it’s just that some 




There is a pertinent difference between performance and the still image: the real enters not 
only the space but also the time of representation. It is encountered chronologically, 
precisely in and through the passage of time inhabited by performance’s (re)presentation. 
In his discussion of Caravaggio, Careri deliberately invokes Walter Benjamin’s construction 
of Now-Time (Jetztzeit) – conceived not as a shallow concern with the immediate here and 
now, but a rich engagement with the present moment. de la Durantaye describes it 
(following Agamben) as ‘a conception of time focused on the radical opportunity that each 
moment brings with it … on the dynamic instant rather than on the progressive and 
normalizing continuum’ (de la Durantaye 2009: 102, original emphasis). In performance, 
because of performance’s inherently bracketing and presentational aspects, this now-time 
is emphasised such that its effects (affects) sustain over time – any instant is potentially a 
situation of immediacy, even if experienced within a continuum, and the continuum itself 
might be a situation of prolonged immediacy. 
 
In this sense, duration in performance has a different quality than it does in photography or 
visual art. In the latter, you can take your time, and encounter (understand, experience) 
heterochronies within a durational moment of your own choosing. In performance, your 
time is taken for you. If ‘duration’ describes the passage of time required for any particular 
sequence, the experience of duration will always to an extent be done to you, arranged as a 
consequence of this particular set of embodied and spatialised figurings taking place in this 
particular organisation of flow. Duration thereby has a kind of concreteness in performance. 
It is doubled, by virtue of being always-also topic (where you recognise it) and managed 
immersion (where you experience that which you cannot avoid, at a pace arranged for you). 
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An awareness of duration in performance is always the production of presence (including 
your own). 
 
This returns us to the Real. It is precisely this sense of duration opening out into actuality 
that lies behind Marina Abramovic’s account of the potency of durational art. In 2010, 
Abramović presented and performed in The Artist is Present, a piece that lasted for 716 
hours (so just under a month) at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. Abramović sat in 
a chair, engaged in a mutual gaze with an individual seated opposite her (one of a series of 
members of the public) – all before a larger audience of spectators who were free to come 
and go. The piece might also have been titled ‘The Spectator is Present’, exemplifying a 
motif of embodied involvement that has long characterised durational art and immersive 
performance. It was apparently during this performance that Abramović had the idea to 
create an institute for ‘new long durational projects’ (Abramović 2013; see also MAI). The 
quest is for various sorts of experiential authenticity. As Abramović said in a lecture in 
Athens, ‘If you keep doing something for one, two, three months – this is not performance, 
this is life itself.’ (Abramović 2016). 
 
In his ‘Introduction’ to On Duration, the volume of Performance Research that provides the 
inception to this essay, Edward Scheer observes that ‘we seek a return to the performative 
of bodies and gestures, in short, a return to a durational ethico-aesthetic to foreground the 
sense of experience over structure’ (2012: 1, original emphasis). This is a call to the kind of 
witting engagement in and through duration that Abramović espouses, and a Bergsonian 
attention to process rather than form. Even so, duration remains cultural. We have learned 
that it is a function of experience, rather than a fixed measure of a passage of time – but the 
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value of duration varies, whether as a particular length of time, a passage for endurance, a 
field for ethical encounter, or a commoditised span of engagement. Of course, the notion of 
duration in performance doesn’t have a clear starting point. Historically, it might suggest the 
five days of the Dionysia, the weeks-long Shrovetide medieval carnivals, the 
conventionalised timeframe of the well-made play (enabling theatre-goers to catch the last 
train to the suburbs), or the kinetic art of the 1960s amid what Chau calls ‘a period of 
temporal turbulence’ (35) by way of accelerating technological growth, machine speeds and 
production processes. A similar chrono-shift characterises our own cultural moment, as 
speed becomes routinised and attention divided, while tastes (literal and aesthetic) demand 
more intense absorption over time – slow food (as well as fast food), serial consumption, 
reiterated pleasure. There is an intensity of affect, through cultural processes of 
concentration and exaggeration. 
 
Duration is predicated on a present-tense encounter amid the passing of time. However, the 
experience of the now-moment will change over time, not only across history but also in the 
weft of a single situation, since durationality has its own pressure and effect – the longer 
something lasts, the more it builds, tires, reminds, deepens, shifts. Time and place (as ever) 
form a vector, but in performance the vector is an experienced phenomenon, a space in 
which the present stretches to another present and change is lived. As Stella Baraklianou 
suggests (in relation to photography), ‘This experienced time is change, perpetually, anew. 
… Time is thus made of various plurals of the present’ (2013: 141). It is this pluralising of the 
present that helps explain the attraction of duration. In a contemporary performance 
economy that privileges encounter and experience, duration provides the substrate – an 
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